The Sciendo website published a paper called "Counter-drone System-a Multi-domain Work", which mainly introduces the current situation of drones and multi-domain anti-drones.The author's translation is now organized as follows for readers to learn and refer to.
Summary
In the past few decades, the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems has changed the modern battlefield, and it has become essential to counter the demand for these cheap, flexible, and expendable systems.UAVs come in a variety of sizes and capabilities. Compared with cruise missiles, larger UAVs may achieve results, while smaller systems are difficult to detect when maneuvering on the battlefield to successfully conduct tactical-level strikes.Therefore, it must be understood that responding to this threat is a common responsibility, and the approach must be comprehensive, covering a wide range of military, civil, and legal perspectives on this topic.In addition, it is clear that it is necessary to adopt multi-domain solutions to eliminate the threat of drones, and countries should be committed to achieving the technical interoperability and standardization conferred by common principles and operating procedures.
1.introduction
UAS now play a vital role in NATO operations and have developed into an important asset for intelligence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and combat missions.
However, other countries and non-state actors, including open enemies of NATO, have been working hard to develop similar systems to gain an advantage in the air field.
At the same time, the civilian market is focusing on small drones, which are used by the public for entertainment purposes. These flying objects are called commercial spot drones.The latest iteration of commercial off-the-shelf drone technology can fly autonomously to designated coordinates, or it can be remotely controlled through the Global mobile communication System (GSM) network using the operator's mobile phone.
The “traditional” measure to counter drones is electronic interference in the command and control (C2) link.GSM networks and autonomous flight invalidate interference, so a new method is needed to combat these emerging technologies.
2.Understand the components of drones
In order to deal with the threat of drones, it is important that we see greater prospects, not just drones.The drone is composed of several components according to its size and mission.Small UAVs usually consist of an operator, a remote control, a command and control link, and the UAVs themselves, while a larger UAVs system also requires a dedicated land-based control system to launch and recover UAVs.Usually, it also requires a task control unit to perform specific operations.In addition, these systems can use space-based over-the-horizon (BLOS) communication for data links and command and control.In short, in addition to drones, these systems also require more physical infrastructure, such as containers, hardware/software for controlling flight and combat. The larger the drone, the greater the demand for land-based support.
3.Drones in the conflict in Ukraine
The war in Ukraine is not the "first drone war."This is not the first conflict in which drones are of great significance, nor is it the first time that hostile parties have used drones.However, their deployment in Ukraine marks a significant shift.Drones have never been used so extensively in military confrontations.
One of the observations of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 was that Russia used drones as intelligence surveillance targets to acquire and detect (ISTAR) assets in a very effective way.By integrating multiple sensing platforms at different altitudes over the same target, Russia has successfully provided a real-time aiming system with complementary imaging functions, while keeping firepower units at a safe distance.It is also worth noting that Russia has used electronic warfare (EW) and cyber warfare very effectively in anti-drone systems, because most of Ukraine's small number of drones have been jammed and shot down.
Between 2015 and 2022, the two sides in the conflict conducted trench warfare in eastern Ukraine, enhancing the capabilities of drones.Russia began to weaponize small eight-rotor helicopters and use them to throw incendiary bombs, but due to sanctions from Western countries, Russia was unable to master key technologies.On the other hand, Ukraine initially used commercial drones to capture targets for mortars and artillery, but they benefited greatly from Western training, so they accumulated a lot of experience and invested in and developed drone technology.
In the resistance movement in eastern Ukraine, civilian drones play a vital role in confirming the location and intentions of the enemy and in destroying the enemy through the deployment of simulated weapons.These direct actions have proven to be very effective due to their fast decision-making process, reliable target verification by drones, and instant contact with identified targets.
According to the open source intelligence agency Oryx, from February 24, 2022 to September 13, 2023, it was confirmed through photo or video evidence that 300 Russian reconnaissance and combat drones were lost in Ukraine.Among these losses, there were 183 Orlan-10 UAVs and their variants, 38 Eleron UAVs, 38 Zala UAVs, 6 Orion UAVs, 6 Forpost UAVs and several other UAVs.
The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that Russia had lost 4,650 drones of various types.This includes many Iranian-made Shahd UAVs, as well as possibly some commercial UAVs that are widely used by the Russian armed forces for military-grade weapons.Due to technical failures and human error, the exact number of UAVs lost by Russia in the occupied areas of Ukraine is still uncertain.In addition, the number of small commercial drones provided by Russian regional administrative departments and volunteers, such as DJI Mavic and other drones, remains unclear.
The latest developments in the drone conflict in Ukraine show that Russia is using Shahd attack drones, also known as ”Kamikaze Special Attack Team" drones, to target population centers and power stations with the aim of disrupting Ukraine's electricity and heating supplies.In response, the Ukrainian armed forces have taken various countermeasures, including small arms fire, heavy machine guns, man-portable air defense missiles and electronic jamming devices, to intercept these drones.However, when drones are deployed on a large scale or “in groups”, shooting down drones becomes very challenging.
As a general conclusion of the war in Ukraine, we can say that local air control rights have become a thing of the past, and the threat of drones is now at the lowest tactical level, so anti-DRONE capabilities need to be deployed at the lowest tactical level.
4.Anti-drone-NATO Perspective
The NATO Defense Minister approved a practical framework for combating Category I drones in February 2019.On July 9, 2021, according to the “silence procedure” (silence procedure), the work plan of the NATO Drone Working Group was approved, aiming to create a NATO drone theory.
The idea is to focus the regulations on the combat level, while leaving the strategic and tactical elements to the following other publications.The doctrine will cross the boundaries between various functions such as force protection and air defense.
It must be pointed out that NATO's “first-level countermeasures theory” will ensure the connection and consistency with other theoretical documents; in particular, the interaction/elimination of conflicts between anti-drone assets and hostile, neutral and friendly actions (such as air defense operations and electromagnetic operations).It will also consider interaction, interoperability and coordination with the NATO Integrated Air Defense and Missile Defense System (IAMD), especially with the capabilities of the ground-based Air defense and Missile Defense System (SBAMD).
On October 12, 2023, at a meeting of defense ministers held in Brussels, NATO allies considered the follow-up actions required to implement NATO's new defense strategy.This includes the allocation of troops, the development of new capabilities, and the adaptation of command and control structures.Therefore, it is clear that NATO is preparing to adopt the anti-drone doctrine in the near future.
NATO is not only committed to developing a theory, but also focuses on exercises aimed at improving technical interoperability and improving the ability to counter drones.NATO organized the Anti-drone system Technology Interoperability Exercise (C-UAS TIE23), which brought together military, scientific, and industrial experts to evaluate advanced commercial solutions for detecting, identifying, and mitigating drone threats.Approximately 70 systems and technologies, including sensors, effectors, jammers, and drones, have undergone field tests.The purpose is to verify whether these cutting-edge solutions can quickly connect and cooperate effectively.The exercise was coordinated by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) and hosted by the Joint Anti-drone Core Organization under the Dutch Ministry of Defense.
In short, NATO has taken important steps in managing the drone threat. The organization's primary goal is to prevent it by paying attention to laws and regulations, using warning signs, and collecting intelligence.The next step is to have situational awareness capabilities that can detect, track, classify, and identify threats.Then, it must enter the reaction stage and be able to deter, defeat, destroy, or capture.Last but not least, the DRONE threat protection system should be able to take the necessary post-mortem actions, such as restoration, utilization, or evaluation.Future research will include the inclusion of thoroughly tested and confirmed practical drone integration solutions.An implied goal is to include a series of recommendations that will be carefully reviewed and involve the direct impact of UAV system integration on various aspects, such as troop structure, decision-making process, standardization, training, and personnel specialization.In addition, it will explore how this integration can contribute to the collective effectiveness of military operations against opponents, including defensive and offensive strategies.
The Sciendo website published a paper called "Counter-drone System-a Multi-domain Work", which mainly introduces the current situation of drones and multi-domain anti-drones.The author's translation is now organized as follows for readers to learn and refer to.
Summary
In the past few decades, the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems has changed the modern battlefield, and it has become essential to counter the demand for these cheap, flexible, and expendable systems.UAVs come in a variety of sizes and capabilities. Compared with cruise missiles, larger UAVs may achieve results, while smaller systems are difficult to detect when maneuvering on the battlefield to successfully conduct tactical-level strikes.Therefore, it must be understood that responding to this threat is a common responsibility, and the approach must be comprehensive, covering a wide range of military, civil, and legal perspectives on this topic.In addition, it is clear that it is necessary to adopt multi-domain solutions to eliminate the threat of drones, and countries should be committed to achieving the technical interoperability and standardization conferred by common principles and operating procedures.
1.introduction
UAS now play a vital role in NATO operations and have developed into an important asset for intelligence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and combat missions.
However, other countries and non-state actors, including open enemies of NATO, have been working hard to develop similar systems to gain an advantage in the air field.
At the same time, the civilian market is focusing on small drones, which are used by the public for entertainment purposes. These flying objects are called commercial spot drones.The latest iteration of commercial off-the-shelf drone technology can fly autonomously to designated coordinates, or it can be remotely controlled through the Global mobile communication System (GSM) network using the operator's mobile phone.
The “traditional” measure to counter drones is electronic interference in the command and control (C2) link.GSM networks and autonomous flight invalidate interference, so a new method is needed to combat these emerging technologies.
2.Understand the components of drones
In order to deal with the threat of drones, it is important that we see greater prospects, not just drones.The drone is composed of several components according to its size and mission.Small UAVs usually consist of an operator, a remote control, a command and control link, and the UAVs themselves, while a larger UAVs system also requires a dedicated land-based control system to launch and recover UAVs.Usually, it also requires a task control unit to perform specific operations.In addition, these systems can use space-based over-the-horizon (BLOS) communication for data links and command and control.In short, in addition to drones, these systems also require more physical infrastructure, such as containers, hardware/software for controlling flight and combat. The larger the drone, the greater the demand for land-based support.
3.Drones in the conflict in Ukraine
The war in Ukraine is not the "first drone war."This is not the first conflict in which drones are of great significance, nor is it the first time that hostile parties have used drones.However, their deployment in Ukraine marks a significant shift.Drones have never been used so extensively in military confrontations.
One of the observations of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 was that Russia used drones as intelligence surveillance targets to acquire and detect (ISTAR) assets in a very effective way.By integrating multiple sensing platforms at different altitudes over the same target, Russia has successfully provided a real-time aiming system with complementary imaging functions, while keeping firepower units at a safe distance.It is also worth noting that Russia has used electronic warfare (EW) and cyber warfare very effectively in anti-drone systems, because most of Ukraine's small number of drones have been jammed and shot down.
Between 2015 and 2022, the two sides in the conflict conducted trench warfare in eastern Ukraine, enhancing the capabilities of drones.Russia began to weaponize small eight-rotor helicopters and use them to throw incendiary bombs, but due to sanctions from Western countries, Russia was unable to master key technologies.On the other hand, Ukraine initially used commercial drones to capture targets for mortars and artillery, but they benefited greatly from Western training, so they accumulated a lot of experience and invested in and developed drone technology.
In the resistance movement in eastern Ukraine, civilian drones play a vital role in confirming the location and intentions of the enemy and in destroying the enemy through the deployment of simulated weapons.These direct actions have proven to be very effective due to their fast decision-making process, reliable target verification by drones, and instant contact with identified targets.
According to the open source intelligence agency Oryx, from February 24, 2022 to September 13, 2023, it was confirmed through photo or video evidence that 300 Russian reconnaissance and combat drones were lost in Ukraine.Among these losses, there were 183 Orlan-10 UAVs and their variants, 38 Eleron UAVs, 38 Zala UAVs, 6 Orion UAVs, 6 Forpost UAVs and several other UAVs.
The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that Russia had lost 4,650 drones of various types.This includes many Iranian-made Shahd UAVs, as well as possibly some commercial UAVs that are widely used by the Russian armed forces for military-grade weapons.Due to technical failures and human error, the exact number of UAVs lost by Russia in the occupied areas of Ukraine is still uncertain.In addition, the number of small commercial drones provided by Russian regional administrative departments and volunteers, such as DJI Mavic and other drones, remains unclear.
The latest developments in the drone conflict in Ukraine show that Russia is using Shahd attack drones, also known as ”Kamikaze Special Attack Team" drones, to target population centers and power stations with the aim of disrupting Ukraine's electricity and heating supplies.In response, the Ukrainian armed forces have taken various countermeasures, including small arms fire, heavy machine guns, man-portable air defense missiles and electronic jamming devices, to intercept these drones.However, when drones are deployed on a large scale or “in groups”, shooting down drones becomes very challenging.
As a general conclusion of the war in Ukraine, we can say that local air control rights have become a thing of the past, and the threat of drones is now at the lowest tactical level, so anti-DRONE capabilities need to be deployed at the lowest tactical level.
4.Anti-drone-NATO Perspective
The NATO Defense Minister approved a practical framework for combating Category I drones in February 2019.On July 9, 2021, according to the “silence procedure” (silence procedure), the work plan of the NATO Drone Working Group was approved, aiming to create a NATO drone theory.
The idea is to focus the regulations on the combat level, while leaving the strategic and tactical elements to the following other publications.The doctrine will cross the boundaries between various functions such as force protection and air defense.
It must be pointed out that NATO's “first-level countermeasures theory” will ensure the connection and consistency with other theoretical documents; in particular, the interaction/elimination of conflicts between anti-drone assets and hostile, neutral and friendly actions (such as air defense operations and electromagnetic operations).It will also consider interaction, interoperability and coordination with the NATO Integrated Air Defense and Missile Defense System (IAMD), especially with the capabilities of the ground-based Air defense and Missile Defense System (SBAMD).
On October 12, 2023, at a meeting of defense ministers held in Brussels, NATO allies considered the follow-up actions required to implement NATO's new defense strategy.This includes the allocation of troops, the development of new capabilities, and the adaptation of command and control structures.Therefore, it is clear that NATO is preparing to adopt the anti-drone doctrine in the near future.
NATO is not only committed to developing a theory, but also focuses on exercises aimed at improving technical interoperability and improving the ability to counter drones.NATO organized the Anti-drone system Technology Interoperability Exercise (C-UAS TIE23), which brought together military, scientific, and industrial experts to evaluate advanced commercial solutions for detecting, identifying, and mitigating drone threats.Approximately 70 systems and technologies, including sensors, effectors, jammers, and drones, have undergone field tests.The purpose is to verify whether these cutting-edge solutions can quickly connect and cooperate effectively.The exercise was coordinated by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) and hosted by the Joint Anti-drone Core Organization under the Dutch Ministry of Defense.
In short, NATO has taken important steps in managing the drone threat. The organization's primary goal is to prevent it by paying attention to laws and regulations, using warning signs, and collecting intelligence.The next step is to have situational awareness capabilities that can detect, track, classify, and identify threats.Then, it must enter the reaction stage and be able to deter, defeat, destroy, or capture.Last but not least, the DRONE threat protection system should be able to take the necessary post-mortem actions, such as restoration, utilization, or evaluation.Future research will include the inclusion of thoroughly tested and confirmed practical drone integration solutions.An implied goal is to include a series of recommendations that will be carefully reviewed and involve the direct impact of UAV system integration on various aspects, such as troop structure, decision-making process, standardization, training, and personnel specialization.In addition, it will explore how this integration can contribute to the collective effectiveness of military operations against opponents, including defensive and offensive strategies.